On-Line Appendix for Chapter 4

Statistical Models of Discussant and Vote Choice

The first set of analyses contains three event count models in which the dependent variables are respectively the *Number of pro-Calderón discussants* each respondent has, the *Number of pro-AMLO discussants* each respondent has, and the *Number of pro-Madrazo discussants* each respondent has. The main independent variables are supply side factors—the county-level vote returns for two of the three candidates—and demand side factors— partisanship, 0-10 point feeling thermometer assessments of each candidate, and vote choice. These demand side factors are measured with Wave 1 data from 9 months before the election (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988). It is important to control for these demand-side factors not only because individuals tend to prefer agreement to dissonance, but also because some individuals may project their own preferences on to discussants when reporting their discussants' political preferences (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). The models also contain measures of political engagement (general political interest, campaign interest, political awareness, and total number of discussants), mainly to avoid the confounding effects that different numbers of discussants might cause. These variables, and especially the total number of discussants, are included more as accounting mechanisms than as theoretically interesting factors. Finally, the models each include a standard list of demographic variables. Table 4.A shows the results. All supply-side factors are statistically significant. Most of the demand-side factors, namely partisanship and past vote choice, are also statistically significant.

[Insert Table 4.A]

The second set of analyses contains the three vote choice models. Because there were four main candidate options (the three major party options plus Patrícia Mercado) in Mexico's 2006 race, I estimated a multinomial logit model. All results relevant to Mercado, however, are omitted to avoid clutter. Table 4.B contains the numerical results for all three models. As described in the text, the fully specified model contains three types of independent variables. Regional effects are shaded in dark grey. Individual-level factors are shaded in light grey and are broken into the four categories discussed at the beginning this chapter: wealth related factors (including wealth, education, ethnicity, and economic issue attitudes), religiosity (including church attendance and moral issue attitudes), urbanization, and political-historical factors (namely partisanship). Discussant effects are not shaded and are merely the number of discussants (on Election Day and six weeks before the election) supporting each candidate of the three main candidates. Nearly all of these discussant variables are statistically significant. Partisanship is clearly the most important variable among the individual-level factors.

[Insert Table 4.B]

Table 4.A: Determinants of the Number of Discussants Supporting Each Candidate

	Number of pro-Calderón discussants	Number of pro-AMLO discussants	Number of pro-Madrazo discussants
Supply of Discussants: Regional "Effects"			
Calderón's vote share in respondent's county	.016** (.005)	-.000 (.005)	.007 (.005)
AMLO's vote share in respondent's county	.002 (.004)	.020* (.005)	0 (0)
Madrazo's vote share in respondent's county	0 (0)	0 (0)	.025* (.010)
Demand for Discussants: Political Preferences and Motivations			
Panista$_{(t-2)}$	.097* (.057)	-.174 (.116)	.033 (.108)
Perredista$_{(t-2)}$	-.837* (.134)	.250* (.058)	-.171 (.166)
Priísta$_{(t-2)}$	.074 (.089)	-.199* (.108)	.329* (.108)
Independent$_{(t-2)}$	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Calderón feeling thermometer$_{(t-2)}$	.363* (.193)	0 (0)	0 (0)
AMLO feeling thermometer$_{(t-2)}$	0 (0)	.172 (.178)	0 (0)
Madrazo feeling thermometer$_{(t-2)}$	0 (0)	0 (0)	.275 (.226)
Voting for Calderón$_{(t-2)}$	.326** (.116)	-.026 (.189)	-.489* (.221)
Voting for AMLO$_{(t-2)}$	-.014 (.124)	.583** (.162)	-.227 (.214)
Voting for Madrazo$_{(t-2)}$	-.277* (.132)	.130 (.187)	.446* (.224)
Undecided or voting for other$_{(t-2)}$	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
Political Engagement			
Interest in politics	.041 (.046)	-.061 (.052)	.227* (.091)
Interest in campaign	.041 (.038)	.116* (.053)	-.116 (.072)
Political awareness	.029 (.028)	.050 (.033)	.011 (.047)
Total number of discussants	.815** (.045)	.890** (.053)	.911** (.079)
Demographics			
Urban resident	.119* (.052)	-.114 (.071)	-.106 (.090)
Education	-.027 (.022)	-.023 (.021)	.017 (.033)
Wealth	.031 (.030)	.023 (.026)	-.021 (.035)
Woman	.114 (.078)	-.198* (.096)	.072 (.116)
Age	-.006* (.003)	-.002 (.002)	.002 (.005)
Skin color	-.057 (.057)	.100* (.060)	.060 (.070)
Constant	-3.644 (.431)	-4.018 (.454)	-4.693 (.439)
Dispersion parameter (α)	0 (0)	0 (0)	.414 (.186)

Notes: Entries are poisson (Calderón and AMLO) or negative binomial (Madrazo) regression coefficients. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering within county) are in parentheses. Results are averaged over 10 imputed datasets (King et al 2001; Royston 2004).
$N = 1594$. * = p<.05, ** = p<.01.

Table 4.B: Determinants of Voting Behavior in Mexico 2006

	Model 1: Regional Effects Only						Model 2: Regional Effects and Individual-Level Traits						Model 3: Regional Effects, Individual-Level Traits, and Discussant Effects					
	$\frac{PAN}{PRD}$		$\frac{PAN}{PRI}$		$\frac{PRD}{PRI}$		$\frac{PAN}{PRD}$		$\frac{PAN}{PRI}$		$\frac{PRD}{PRI}$		$\frac{PAN}{PRD}$		$\frac{PAN}{PRI}$		$\frac{PRD}{PRI}$	
	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.	$\hat{\beta}$	S.E.
Regional Effects																		
PAN vote share in county	.014	.010	.063	.011	.050	.014	.005	.014	.038	.013	.033	.016	.000	.015	.030	.014	.030	.017
PRD vote share in county	-.053	.001	.035	.011	.088	.014	-.041	.013	.016	.012	.057	.017	-.033	.015	.010	.013	.043	.016
PRI vote share in county	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wealth-Related Factors																		
Wealth							-.046	.054	.022	.063	-.012	.069	-.066	.070	-.067	.072	-.001	.085
Education							.035	.047	-.015	.068	.031	.077	.052	.059	.062	.074	.011	.076
Skin color							.036	.166	.006	.154	-.031	.179	.166	.171	.034	.143	-.132	.182
Support for more trade with US $_{t-2}$							-.014	.076	-.045	.068	-.032	.082	-.063	.093	-.104	.074	-.041	.098
Support for priv. investment in elec. $_{t-2}$							.088	.062	.035	.074	-.054	.076	.108	.080	.034	.082	-.074	.086
Religiosity																		
Frequency of church attendance $_{t-2}$							.016	.083	-.003	.100	-.019	.099	.012	.099	-.003	.113	-.014	.110
Support for abortion rights if raped $_{t-2}$							-.029	.053	-.104	.059	-.075	.062	-.050	.063	-.105	.066	-.055	.065
Support for capital punishment $_{t-2}$							.026	.058	.038	.060	.012	.070	.020	.064	-.009	.065	-.029	.081
Urbanization and Other Demographics																		
Urban resident							.123	.126	.142	.144	.019	.170	.066	.133	.062	.143	-.004	.170
Woman							.737	.177	.277	.198	-.460	.235	.624	.200	.353	.218	-.271	.263
Age							-.002	.006	-.005	.008	-.004	.008	-.002	.007	-.002	.009	-.000	.009
Political-Historical Factors																		
Panista $_{t-2}$							1.06	.172	1.33	.327	.265	.335	.993	.191	1.27	.316	.281	.313
Perredista $_{t-2}$							-1.53	.245	-.244	.307	1.28	.268	-.960	.227	.054	.310	1.02	.274
Priísta $_{t-2}$							.175	.143	-1.06	.148	-1.24	.184	.208	.182	-.897	.164	-1.10	.203
Independent							0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Discussant Effects																		
Number of pro-Calderón discussants $_{t}$													.590	.156	.582	.140	-.008	.199
Number of pro-AMLO discussants $_{t}$													-1.02	.160	-.235	.250	.781	.217
Number of pro-Madrazo discussants $_{t}$													-.135	.167	-.707	.177	-.572	.188
Number of pro-Calderón discussants $_{t-1}$													.700	.207	.508	.211	-.192	.310
Number of pro-AMLO discussants $_{t-1}$													-.327	.145	.207	.224	.535	.221
Number of pro-Madrazo discussants $_{t-1}$													-.083	.191	-.276	.156	-.193	.172
Constant	1.75	.701	-2.76	.709	-4.51	.950	.820	1.28	-.880	.873	-1.70	1.38	.899	1.32	-2.71	.917	-1.17	1.46

Notes: Entries are multinomial logit coefficients and standard errors. A fourth choice, minor candidate Patrícia Mercado, was also included in the choice set, but all results related to her are not shown to reduce clutter. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within county. I report coefficients for all three pairwise combinations (rather than just two) to ease interpretation.
$N = 1233$. Due to space limitations, the table does not denote statistical significance.